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Abstract 
This article demonstrates the relationship between the utility function's parameters which represent 
consumer's taste and the reservation price. We describe the changes in the reservation price analytically and 
supplement the geometrical illustrations by economic interpretations. We formulate the monopolist’s 
problem of setting the price of a capital good and the price of a service that the capital good provides as the 
two stage programming problem and illustrate the influence of consumers’ preferences and their income on 
the service market client structure and monopolist’s decisions  on couple of illustrative examples. 
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A two-part tariff problem includes pricing of capital goods and services it provides. The best known example 
includes monopolist's setting of park admission prices and individual rides prices in Disneyland [5]. In 
maximizing the profit monopolist takes into account consumers' reactions. Every consumer compares the 
admission fee and the highest price he or she is willing to pay for a capital good. After paying a lump sum 
fee for the right to buy a product, the consumer confronts the problem of efficient allocation of the remaining 
income. Diversity of tastes and wealth causes analytical difficulties in maximizing monopolist's profit. This 
article formulates the pricing policy of two-part tariffs as the two stage programming problem [1,4] and 
solves that problem. In characterizing consumers' tastes we start from subjective preferences and analyze 
how changes in consumers' tastes influence the monopolist's choices. The standard approach found in the 
literature usually starts from the demand functions or indirect utility functions accompanied by capital goods 
and services pricing description. However, it neglects the fact that the fundamental concept in representing 
the consumer's preferences is the binary preference relation which is represented by a real-valued utility 
function. This paper underlines a connection between the reservation price and the utility function's 
parameters which represent consumer's taste. Changes in these parameters influence the highest price each 




consumer is willing to pay for capital good. The price of capital good determines the consumer structure in 
the service market provided by the capital good. It is important to highlight the significance of consumers' 
wealth on consumers' decision to buy a service which implies that income effect should not be neglected. 
Since the monopolist's profit is affected by the consumers' reactions, it is natural to formulate the two-part 
tariff problem as the two stage programming problem. The fact that the consumer must pay a lump sum fee 
for the right to buy a product implies the problem of determining the reservation price. Analytical and 
geometrical analysis of a relationship between the service price and the reservation price is being 
accompanied by the analysis of the effect  of a change in a consumer's taste on the reservation price. If the 
price of a capital good is higher than the reservation price, corresponding consumer won't enter the service 
market. We establish the unambiguous relationship between the price of the capital good and the service 
market client structure, by at the same time taking into account the influence of consumers' wealth on the 
decision to buy a product. We formulate the problem of maximizing the monopolist's profit as the two stage 
programming problem and solve it. We offer illustrative examples in which we demonstrate the influence of 
consumers' preferences and their structure on the price of capital good and the monopolist's service price.  
 
2. The reservation price 
 
The consumer’s problem of efficient allocation of limited income usually reduces to the choice of the most 
preferred bundle from the consumer’s budget set. Composite commodity theorem highlights the desired good 
or service and non-satiated consumer maximizes utility subject to the given budget constraint: 
 








      (1) 
The budget constraint is determined by the consumer's nominal income M and the prices p the consumer 
faces. Quantity of service x and the consumption of all other goods m are arguments of the direct utility 
function, u(x,m), and as a result of optimization we get the indirect utility function, v(p,M), and Marshallian 
demand functions, ),( Mpx M  and ),( MpmM . Marshallian demand functions describe solutions to the 
above optimization problem for various prices and income. Existence and uniqueness of these solutions are 
the result of characteristics of preferences and properties of the budget set. Preferences are described by 
strongly increasing and strictly quasiconcave utility function. Sometimes the consumer cannot enjoy the 
consumption of service without the capital good which has its price, cp . Best known examples of capital 
goods are admission fee for Disneyland and the Polaroid camera [6].  
Purchasing the capital good reduces the budget of the consumer, who speculates whether to buy a capital 
good or spend entire available budget on other goods. In doing so, he compares maximal utility from 
possessing capital good and utility from spending the whole budget on other goods and buys the capital good 
only when the following inequality holds, 
 ).,0(),( MupMpv c        (2) 
By inverting the indirect utility function we get the expenditure function, ),( upe . The expenditure function 
and the compensated demand functions, ),( upx H  and ),( upmH , are derived from the model of 
minimizing the expenditure subject to the given utility level, u,  
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Since the expenditure function is strongly increasing in the utility level, the inequality (2) is equivalent to the 
following: 
)),,0(,()),(,( MupepMpvpe c      (4) 
)),,0(,( MupepM c        (5) 
.)),0(,( cpMupeM        (6) 
The highest price the consumer is willing to pay for capital good, so called reservation price, rp , is thus 
equal to the difference between the nominal income and the minimal expenditures that ensures the level of 
utility that corresponds to the situation where the consumer does not buy the capital good [2],  
 )).,0(,( MupeMp r        (7) 
The relevant indifference curve for the consumer is the one that goes through the bundle (0,M) and the 
consumer chooses that bundle in which the isoexpenditure curve with slope determined by price of service is 
tangent to the indifference curve. The reservation price is represented by the distance between the intercepts 
of the indifference curve and the tangent on the vertical axis. 
 
 Figure 1. The reservation price 
When the price of a service increases, it is intuitive to expect that the consumer is willing to pay less for the 
capital good. Because of the law of diminishing marginal rate of substitution between goods the point of 
tangency moves on the left and the distance between the corresponding intercepts or the reservation price 






dp Hr    (8) 
The ordinal approach to the consumer theory starts with the subjective preferences that are represented by 
the preference function or the ordinal utility function. Market changes induce active consumer to substitute 




the more expensive good with the cheaper one. In so doing savings are determined by the substitution 




  mxmxu     (9) 
The consumer minimizes the expenditure in order to achieve a given level of utility when he finds that 
bundle on the relevant indifference curve that equals the marginal rate of substitution between goods and the 





x          (10) 
The second equation of the system that the consumer solves includes the constraint and the expenditure 
function for the above utility function is the following 
 .)1(),( 1
1
1 upupe          (11) 
Notice that the elasticity of substitution enters the expression (11) for the expenditure function, [3] 
1 .
1
           (12) 
The expenditure function and the equality that describes the reservation price detect the unambiguous 
relationship between the reservation price and the elasticity of substitution,  
1
1 1(1 ( 1) ) .rp p M          (13) 
It can be easily verified that an increase in the elasticity of substitution adversely affects the consumer's 
willingness to buy the capital good. In other words, the reservation price is a decreasing function of the 
elasticity of substitution. 
In order to prove it, the following function from the equality that describes the reservation price can be 
introduced, 
1
11 )1()(    pf .  
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Figure 2. The reservation price and the elasticity of substitution 
 
Knowing how the elasticity of substitution is related to the curvature of the indifference curves, the previous 
statement can be graphically illustrated. 
The larger the elasticity of substitution, the flatter are the indifference curves and they are more like 
linear indifference curves that characterize perfect substitutability between the goods. In that case, the 
intercept of the tangent on the vertical axis approaches the intercept of the indifference curve on the vertical 
axis and the reservation price declines. The elasticity of substitution for perfect substitutes is infinite and the 
rational consumer completely substitutes the service with the consumption of all other goods when the price 
of a service is higher than the constant marginal rate of substitution between goods. In that case the consumer 
is not willing to pay anything for the capital good. The more difficult is the substitution between goods, the 
higher price is the consumer willing to pay for the capital good.   
 
 
3. The profit maximization 
 
The owner of a firm that sells the capital good and the service that the capital good provides determines the 
prices that maximize his or her profit. Let us assume that there are no other firms in the market and let us 
neglect fixed costs and the costs of capital goods for the moment. Let us also assume that the marginal costs 
of a service that the capital good provides are constant, c. The profit that the monopolist earns from a single 
consumer consists of two parts, the amount that the consumer pays for the capital good and the profit from 
services,  
).,()( cMc pMpxcpp      (17) 




The quantity of a service that the consumer demands is determined from his or her Marshallian demand 
function and the residual budget. If the price of a capital good is higher than the reservation price of a single 
consumer, that consumer won't enter the market and the profit that the owner of a firm earns from this 
consumer is equal to zero. If we analyze a homogeneous group of consumers with respect to subjective 
preferences and wealth, the analysis becomes the simplest one. The problem of two-part tariff is then 









    (18) 
If the elasticity of substitution for this group of consumers is 2 , the reservation price for CES utility 
function (9) is 
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 and price of a service is equal to reservation price 
.
1 p
Mpp rc                                                                       (20) 











Mpcp c        (21) 
Equality between optimal price of a service and marginal costs is valid in general case of normal goods [5]. 





         (22) 
The equality (22) expresses the maximal average profit and the total profit depends on a number of 
homogeneous consumers. In reality consumers differ with respect to taste and wealth and the profit 
maximizing firm determines the price of products on a basis of consumers' reactions. If the firm decides to 
charge a unique price for the capital good, it loses consumers who are not willing to pay that much for the 
capital good. Because of the various consumers' reactions, it is natural to formulate the two-part tariff 
problem as the two stage programming problem. 
 
4. Two-part tariffs problem as the two stage programming problem 
 
The problem in question, as presented beforehand, can be formulated as the two stage programming 
problem. In the first stage, the monopolist selling the capital good and the service makes the decision about 
the price of the capital good and the price of the service with the goal of maximizing his profit. These prices 
trigger different reactions of consumers who are divided into homogenous groups where each group is 
characterized by its income and elasticity of substitution. Once the prices of the capital good and the service 
are set, in the second stage each consumer group independently determines the level of its demand so as to 
maximize the correspondent utility function. Therefore, when making the decision about the price of the 




capital good and the price of the service, the monopolist has to take into account the reactions of the 
consumers since his profit is directly affected by consumers’ reactions. 
Let n denote the number of consumer groups, is  size of the consumer group i, iM  income of the 
consumer group i, i  elasticity of substitution for the consumer group i, c marginal cost of a service that the 
capital good provides and let be a sufficiently large number. The monopolist has to make a decision about 
price of the capital good, cp , and price of the service, p. The decision variables of each consumer from 
consumer group i consider quantity of service consumed, ix , expenditure on all other goods, im , and 
reservation price, rip . Also, they make the decision about whether or not to consume the good, i , where 
1i   if consumers from group i are consuming the good in question and 0 otherwise. 
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     
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                                                  s.t. 
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p p   
      (27) 
i ix           (28) 
 , 0, 0,1i i ix m         (29) 
The monopolist has to determine the price of the capital good, cp , and the price of the service, p, in order to 
maximize his profit (23). However, when making the decision the monopolist has to take into account that 
each of the n consumer groups will make a decision about consumption independently according to their 
individual objectives and constraints, which will directly influence monopolist’s profit. A certain consumer 
group will consume the good only if that the price of the capital good is less or equal than its reservation 
price. Therefore, the monopolist’s profit consists of the sum of profits per each consumer group, where profit 
per consumer groups i is 0 if that group is not consuming the good ( 0i  ), and equal to 
 ci is p p c x       if the group is consuming the good. Hereby  c ip p c x      is the profit per each 
member of the group and is  is the number of members in that group. 
Once the monopolist determines the price of the capital good and the price of the service, in the 
second stage each of the n consumer groups independently makes a decision about the consumption of that 
good while trying to maximize its utility (24). Therefore, the second stage consists of n independent 
optimization problems, one per each consumer group. Since groups are homogeneous, it suffices to consider 




the behavior of one individual consumer per group. A member of group i has to make the decision about 
whether it will consume the good and the service offered by the monopolist, described by i , as well as 
about the quantity of the service consumed, ix , in order to maximize its utility (24). The decision about the 
quantity of the service implies the decision regarding the expenditure on other goods, im . The utility is being 
maximized under the set of constraints (25)-(29). Should members of the group i decide to buy the capital 
good, each of them has a budget of  ciM p  left for spending on buying the service ( ipx ) and other goods 
( im ) as shown by budget constraint (25). If the members of group i are not buying the capital good, than 
0i   and the whole budget is being spent on other goods. Reservation price for group i is determined by 
(26). Members of group i will buy the good and the service only if the price of the capital good is less that 
the corresponding reservation price, as shown by (27) and (28). All decision variables should be non-
negative, as required by (29). 
We will illustrate the problem in question as well as it economic interpretation by using the 
following two examples. 
 
Example 1. Let us consider a monopolist who has to determine the price of the capital good and the price of 
the service in presence of two homogeneous consumer groups, where the marginal costs of a service that the 
capital good provides is equal to 1. Group 1 consists of 4 members, has an income of 10 and its elasticity of 
substitution is equal to 2. Group 2 consists of 2 members where each member has an income of 40 and 
elasticity of substitution 2. Note that both groups have the same elasticity of substitution, but differ in their 
income. 
The monopolist has to determine the price of the capital good, cp , and the service, p, in order to 
maximize its profit given by 
   1 1 2 2
0, 0
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Given the prices cp  and p, each consumer from group 1 will make the decision about whether to consume 










   
       (31) 
  s.t. 
1 1 10
c
ipx m p           (32) 





c rp p   
      (34)  
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The similar problem for consumers from group 2 is as follows: 
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  . Since 1 2
r rp p  
for all p, in order to determine the optimal reservation prices and the optimal service price, we have to 
consider the following 3 cases: 
 
Case 1: 10
c rp p   
Since 1
c rp p , we know that 1 2 1   , so the monopolist determines the price of the capital good 
so as to maximize the profit function  
      
2
1 2
6 1 20 20





p p x p p x
p p
                       
The maximum is achieved for 1,7p   and 1 3,7c rp p   with 1 37,13  . 
Case 2: rcr ppp 21   
Since 2
r cp p , we know that 1 0   and 2 1  , so the monopolist determines the price of the capital 
good so as to maximize the profit function  
     2
40=2 1 2 1
1
c
c c pp p x p p
p p
               
 
The maximum is achieved for p=1 and 2 20
c rp p   with 2 40  . 
 
 
Case 3: cr pp 2  
Since crr ppp  21 , we know that 1 2 0   , and the monopolist’s profit is equal to 3 0  . 
 
By comparing these three possibilities, we see that the maximum profit is achieved in Case 2. Therefore, the 
optimal price of the capital good is 20cp   and the optimal price for the service is p=1. Although both 
consumer groups have the same elasticity, here only consumers from group 2 consume the good. The 




quantity of service consumed is 2 10x   with expenditure on other goods 2 10m  . However, if the income 
of group 2 rises to 1 12M  , the maximum profit is obtained for 1,62p   and 4,57cp   with 
2 42,16  , so if the income of group 1 is above 12, both groups will consume the good.  
 
Example 2. Let us consider monopolist and two homogenous consumer groups where the marginal costs of a 
service that the capital good provides is equal to 2. Hereby both groups consist of 4 members and both have 
elasticity of substitution 2. However, income of the first group is 20, while the income of the second one is 
40. By conducting the same analysis as in Example 1, we conclude that the optimal prices of the service and 
the capital good are 2,7p   and 5,41cp  , with the maximum profit max 57,03  . Here, both groups 
are buying the good ( 1 1  , 2 1  , 1 10.65x  , 2 25.24x  , 1 5, 41rp  , 2 10,81rp  ). However, if the 
elasticity of the second group increases to 2 4  , the group structure changes and now only the first group 
is buying the good. Hereby the optimal values of the decision variables are 2p  , 20
3
cp  , 1 1  , 
2 0  , 1 809x  , 2 0x  , 1 10,75




In this paper subjective preferences that are represented by constant elasticity of substitution have been used 
as a starting point for analysis of the two-part tariff problem. Contributions are manifested in directly relating 
the reservation price and parameters that represent consumer’s taste. Changes of reservation price due to 
changes in the service price or the consumer’s taste are described analytically and illustrations of these 
changes are economically interpreted. At the same time, in the analysis of consumers’ reactions, their wealth 
is taken into account. By comparing the reservation price and the service price, client structure on the service 
market is determined. Because of the heterogeneity of the consumers, the problem of setting the price of a 
capital good and the price of a service that the capital good provides is formulated as the two stage 
programming problem. Solving that problem is illustrated by economically interesting examples that show 
how the changes in consumer’ taste and income influence the market client structure, the service price and 
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